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CONSTITUTIONAL LAw-THE FEDERAL SYSTEM--STATE SOVEREIGNTY
AS AN IMPLIED RESTRAINT UPON THE COMMERCE

PowER-National

League of Citiesv. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976).

In 1974 Congress enacted amendments to the Fair Labor Standards Act1 (FLSA) extending coverage of the minimum wage and
maximum hour provisions to almost all employees of state governments and their instrumentalities. 2 The constitutionality of these
amendments was challenged by intergovernmental organizations and
numerous cities and states 3 in an action for declaratory and injunctive
relief brought against the Secretary of Labor. 4 Plaintiffs contended that
the 1974 amendments were beyond the authority delegated to Congress through the commerce clause 5 because they directly displaced
state policies concerning performance of essential state functions. The
three-judge district court, with some suggestion of reluctance, 6 held
the 1974 amendments not unconstitutional upon the controlling authority of Maryland v. Wirtz.7
The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Justice
Rehnquist s acknowledged that the commerce clause is a delegation of
plenary authority to Congress, but also noted that exercise of this
power is subject to any affirmative limitations contained in the Consti1. Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-219 (1970).
2. This extension of coverage was accomplished by extending the definition of
"employer" to include "public agency," 29 U.S.C. § 203(d) (Supp. V 1975); by
defining "public agency" to include states, 29 U.S.C. § 203(x) (Supp. V 1975); and
by defining "enterprise" to include "activity of a public agency," 29 U.S.C. § 203(s)
(Supp. V 1975).
3. Plaintiffs were the National League of Cities, the National Governors' Conference and the governments of 19 states, 1 metropolitan area and 3 cities.
4. National League of Cities v. Brennan, 406 F. Supp. 826 (D.D.C. 1974).
5. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 8, cl. 3 provides, "The Congress shall have Power... To
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
the Indian Tribes."
6. 406 F. Supp. at 828. The memorandum opinion indicated disagreement with
the reasoning in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183 (1968), but concluded that it is
not proper for a district court to disregard a controlling Supreme Court precedent.
7. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). In a 6-2 decision, the Court in Wirtz held that the
commerce power provided a constitutional basis for extending the minimum wage
and maximum hour provisions of the FLSA to the employees of state-operated
schools and hospitals.
8. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell and Stewart joined with Justice
Rehnquist. Justice Blackmun, concurring, also joined in the Court's opinion. Justice
Brennan dissented, joined by Justices White and Marshall. Justice Stevens filed a
separate dissenting opinion.
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tution.9 Although the 1974 amendments would otherwise represent a
valid exercise of Congress' power to regulate intrastate matters which
"substantially affect" interstate commerce,' 0 the Court was persuaded
that the effect of the amendments would be an unwarranted congressional interference with integral sovereign functions of state governments. The Court concluded that such an exercise of congressional
power does not comport with the federal system established by the
Constitution. Held: Insofar as the challenged amendments operate to
directly displace the states' freedom to structure operations which are
integral to the delivery of traditional governmental services, they are
beyond the commerce power. National League of Cities v. Usery, 426
U.S. 833 (1976).
National League is notable for two reasons: (1) it is the first Supreme Court decision to impose a state sovereignty limitation upon
the commerce power; and (2) the Court expressly overruled Maryland
v. Wirtz, a 1968 case that had rejected a state sovereignty challenge to
similar legislation. 1 '
This note has four main objectives: (1) to evaluate the Court's reliance upon the structures and relationships established by the Constitution to support an implied limitation upon congressional power; (2) to
consider whether the rationale behind intergovernmental tax immunities should be extended to commerce clause legislation; (3) to ascertain when a state sovereignty limitation is not appropriate; and (4) to
identify some theoretical and practical implications National League
may have for the future of the federal system. The primary conclusion
reached is that the continued existence of the federal system requires
the imposition of a state sovereignty limitation on all exercises of con9. As examples of such affirmative limitations, the Court observed that commerce
clause legislation had been held invalid if found to offend the right to trial by jury.
United States v. Jackson, 390 U.S. 570 (1968) (death penalty provision of the Federal Kidnapping Act, permitting imposition only if recommended by jury. held
unconstitutional because it discourages exercise of right to trial by jury), or the due
process clause of the fifth amendment, Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969)
(irrebuttable presumption in transfer tax statute deeming possession of marijuana
conclusive evidence that possessor knew of its illegal importation held unconstitutional).
10. See, e.g., Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942); United States v. Darby.
312 U.S. 100 (1941); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
11. Although it could be argued that the services provided by state-operated
schools and hospitals are not within a state's sovereign functions, the Court concluded that these schools and hospitals provide "an integral portion of those governmental services which the States and their political subdivisions have traditionally
afforded their citizens." 426 U.S. at 855.
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gressional power which unnecessarily interfere with the states' constitutionally guaranteed autonomy. It is further concluded, however,
that in certain cases it is consistent with the structure of the federal
system that the states' implied immunity from congressional control
yield to the exigencies of the Union. When the national interest clearly
compels state compliance with federal standards, and when the
burden imposed is not excessive, then a state sovereignty limitation is
not appropriate.
I. BACKGROUND
A.

The Commerce Power

Gibbons v. Ogden,'2 decided in 1824, laid the foundation for all
future adjudication concerning Congress' power to regulate interstate
commerce.' 3 Chief Justice Marshall noted three restrictions upon the
scope of this power. First, Congress has authority under the commerce clause to regulate only interstate commerce; it may not reach
commerce that is "completely internal" to any one state. 14 Second,
although Congress' commerce power is plenary, it is limited by such
restrictions as are "prescribed in the constitution. ' ' 15 These first two
limitations are judicially enforceable' 6 safeguards to prevent Congress
from exceeding its constitutional authority. The third, however, is derived directly from the electorate and the political process. Once the
judicial branch has determined that Congress acted within constitutional limits, only political safeguards can protect the people from
7
Congress' abuse of its legal power.'
12.

22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824).

13.

See C. BLACK, PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23 (1963). See genTHE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND WAITE

erally F. FRANKFURTER,
(1937).

14. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 195.
15. Id. See note 9 supra.
16. A restraint on Congress' authority is "judicially enforceable" only when a
specific case raises the question of whether Congress exceeded its constitutional power
when it enacted certain legislation. For a 'general discussion of the doctrine of judicial review, see Chief Justice Marshall's opinion in Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 176-78 (1803).
17. It was Marshall's view that those political safeguards inherent in our representative government are the only restraints against Congress' misuse of its enumerated
powers:
If, as has always been understood, the sovereignty of congress, though limited to
specified objects, is plenary as to those objects, the power over commerce with
foreign nations, and among the several states, is vested in congress as absolutely
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Although the commerce power is restricted to matters in interstate
commerce, it is settled that the doctrine of implied powers, reinforced
by the necessary and proper clause, 18 extends to Congress the authority to regulate private intrastate activity when such regulation
could be an appropriate means of fostering interstate commerce. 19 But
whether Congress can control a state's governmental affairs in the interest of promoting interstate commerce was not decided 20 until Maryland v. Wirtz. 2' In that case, the Court sustained the 1966 amendas it would be in a single government, having in its constitution the same restrictions on the exercise of the power as are found in the constitution of the United
States. The wisdom and discretion of congress, their identity with the people, and
the influence which their constituents possess at elections, are, in this, as in many
other instances, as that, for example, of declaring war, the sole restraints on which
they have relied, to secure them from its abuse.
22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) at 197 (emphasis added). See generally Wechsler, The Political
Safeguards of Federalisnm--The Role of the States in the Composition and Selection of
the National Government, 54 COLUM. L. REv. 543 (1954).
18. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl.18 provides: "Congress shall have Power . . .To
make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the
foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof."
19. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819). Note Chief
Justice Marshall's famous proclamation concerning the scope of authority granted
by the necessary and proper clause: "Let the end be legitimate. let it be within the
scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit
of the constitution, are constitutional." Id. at 421. Thus, when regulation of intrastate commerce would be "appropriate" or "plainly adapted" to the "legitimate end"
of fostering and protecting interstate commercial intercourse, then such regulation is
a valid exercise of congressional authority.
This principle was affirmed with respect to the commerce power in a series of
cases beginning with NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
where the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 was upheld against the argument
that unfair labor practices are intrastate activities. The Court declared that if admittedly intrastate activities "have such a close and substantial relation to interstate
commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that commerce
from burdens and obstructions," then Congress has authority to regulate such activities. Id. at 37. Indeed, in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. I11 (1942). where the
quantity of wheat grown for on-farm consumption was found subject to federal
control, the Court held that an isolated intrastate activity with negligible impact on
interstate commerce is not beyond federal power if that activity can be rationally
included in a class of similar activities which when taken together have a substantial
effect upon interstate commerce.
20. In United States v. California. 297 U.S. 175 (1936). which held the Federal
Safety Appliance Act applicable to a state-owned railroad, the Court decided that
California, "by engaging in interstate commerce by rail, . . . subjected itself to the
commerce power." Id. at 185 (emphasis added). The question of whether state activities which are completely internal to the state, such as traditional governmental
activities, are amenable to congressional control was not before the Court. See C.
BLACK, supra note 13, at 41.
21. 392 U.S. 183 (1968). The district court's opinion, reported at 269 F. Supp.
826 (D. Md. 1967), was the subject of several law review commentaries. See 56
GEO. L.J. 392 (1967); 81 HARV. L. REV. 1572 (1968); 66 MICH. L. REV. 750 (1968);
43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 414 (1968).
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ments to the FLSA which extended the minimum wage and maximum
hour provisions of the FLSA to employees of state-owned and -operated schools and hospitals. 22 The Court expressly rejected the argument that a judicially enforceable state sovereignty restraint upon the
23
coffimerce power is inherent in the Constitution's federal system.
The Court partly justified the challenged legislation, however, as en24
tailing only a small intrusion into state functions.
In Fry v. United-States,25 the Court was faced with much the same
issue but with significant factual variations. Responding to a national
economic crisis, Congress passed the Economic Stabilization Act of
197026 which empowered the President to temporarily stabilize wages
at certain levels. 27 Pursuant to the Act, the state of Ohio was enjoined
by the Temporary Emergency Court of Appeals from paying state
statutory wage increases to state employees. 2 8 The Supreme Court relied upon Wirtz to uphold the injunction, thus sustaining federal regulation of Ohio's sovereign function. Again, the Court justified the legislation as involving only a slight invasion of state sovereignty, 29 but
further observed that without the injunction, "the effectiveness of federal action would have been drastically impaired. '30
B.

Intergovernmental Immunities: An Implied Constitutional
Restraint on CongressionalPower
Justice Rehnquist dissented in Fry on the ground that the Court's

22. The 1966 amendments at issue in Wirtz were 29 U.S.C. § 203(d), (r), &
(s)
(1970).
23. 392 U.S. at 195.
24. Id. at 193-94.
25. 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
26. Economic Stabilization Act of 1970 (ESA), 12 U.S.C. § 1904 note (1970 &
Supp. V 1975).
27. The ESA was extended five times before it expired on April 30, 1974. 421
U.S. at 543 n.l.
28. United States v. Ohio, 487 F.2d 936 (Emer. Ct. App. 1973).
29. The Court observed that although the 10th amendment may describe certain limits to Congress' authority, those limits were not exceeded by enactment of
the ESA:
While the Tenth Amendment has been characterized as a "truism," stating merely
that "all is retained which has not been surrendered," . . . it is not without
significance. The Amendment expressly declares the constitutional policy that
Congress may not exercise power in a fashion that impairs the States' integrity
or their ability to function effectively in a federal system. Despite the extravagant claims on this score made by some amici, we are convinced that the wage
restriction regulations constituted no such drastic invasion of state sovereignty.
421 U.S. at 547 n.7.
30. 421 U.S. at 548.
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holding was a threat to the continued existence of the federal sys-

tem. 31 He would have had the Court recognize "an affirmative constitutional right, inherent in [Ohio's] capacity as a State, to be free from
such congressionally asserted authority. '32 He posited the basis for

this affirmative limitation in the structure of the federal system and,
by analogy, in the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunities:

"[T] he [states'] immunity from [federal] taxation has no explicit
constitutional source and appears to rest solely on a concept of constitutional federalism which should likewise limit federal power under
the Commerce Clause. 3 3
The doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunities was used initially

to protect legitimate federal activities from interference by state taxation. 34 The Court later expanded the doctrine in order to shield cer-

tain state activities from federal tax interference. 35 The Court reasoned that the states were due a reciprocal immunity from federal

taxes because the unimpaired existence of the states is essential to the
preservation of the Constitution's federal system.3 6 Exactly which

state activities are immune remains the subject of some dispute, al31. Generally, the Court has rejected state autonomy challenges to federal commerce clause legislation. In United States v. California. 297 U.S. 175 (1936). the
Court conceded that the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunities represents a
restriction of Congress' taxing power inferred from the nature of the federal system.
Nevertheless, the Court expressly rejected the argument that a similar restriction
should be imposed upon the commerce power. Id. at 184 (dictum). This remark has
been criticized as unpersuasive because the federal system can be as easily disrupted
by the commerce power as by the taxing power. Salmon, The Federalist Principle:
The Interaction of the Commerce Clause and the Tenth Amendment in the Clean
Air Act, 2 COL. J. ENVIR. L. 290, 349 (1976); see C. BLACK, supra note 13. at 29:
notes 73 & 74 and accompanying text infra. An example of commerce clause legislation which is prima facie disruptive of the federal system's balance of power is the
Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857a-1 (1970 & Supp. IV 1974). which requires the
states to enact, fund, administer and enforce programs that Congress has detailed.
See Comment, The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: A Threat to Federalism?,
76 COLUM. L. REV. 990 (1976).
32. 421 U.S. at 553.
33. Id. at 554.
34. McCulloch v. Maryland. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
35. In Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (11 Wall.) 113 (1870), where the salary of a
state judge was held not subject to the federal taxing power, the Court observed that
federal taxes could not be levied so as to interfere with state functions despite Marshall's assertion in McCalloch of federal supremacy. See McCuiloch v. Maryland.
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 428-31 (1819).
36. Collector v. Day, 78 U.S. (II Wall.) 113 (1870). Two years earlier, in Texas
v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700, 725 (1868). the Court had declared:
Not only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent autonomy
to the States, through their union under the Constitution. but it may be not
unreasonably said that the preservation of the States, and the maintenance of
their governments, are as much within the design and care of the Constitution
as the preservation of the Union and the maintenance of the National govern-
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though the Justices are in apparent agreement that a state's sovereign
37
or governmental activities are beyond Congress' taxing power.
New York v. United States38 was the Court's most recent attempt to
define the extent of state immunity from federal taxation. Unfortunately, there were three opinions written, none of which spoke for a
majority. 39 Justice Frankfurter's lead opinion proposed the "uniquely
capable" test, whereby Congress has authority to tax non-discriminatorily any "source of revenue by whomsoever earned and not uniquely
capable of being earned by a State .... -40 But both Chief Justice
Stone41 and Justice Douglas, 42 in separate opinions, criticized the
ment. The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible Union,
composed of indestructible States.
37. As early as 1824, the Court recognized that not all activities carried on by
state governments are necessarily sovereign. In a context different from intergovernmental immunities, Chief Justice Marshall observed: "[W] hen a government becomes a partner in any trading company, it divests itself, so far as concerns the
transactions of that company, of its sovereign character, and takes that of a private
citizen." Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.)
904, 907 (1824) (partial ownership by state does not confer I 1th amendment immunity).
It was not until South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905), that the
Court expressly distinguished a state's governmental and proprietary activities in
the context of intergovernmental tax immunities. In that case, the Court sustained
the application of a federal excise tax to sales by a state-operated liquor business.
The Court observed that although Congress is precluded from interfering with a
state's governmental functions, whenever a state participates in business activities
of a private nature, those activities are subject to the federal taxing power.
One problem with this governmental/proprietary distinction is that revenue derived
from state activities of a private business nature will be used by the state in its governmental capacity. Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439 (1938) (receipts from ticket
sales to state college football games are subject to federal income tax). In rejecting
this argument, the Court observed that when a state chooses to support governmental
activities by operating what is essentially a private business, it does not immunize that
source of revenue from federal taxation.
38. 326 U.S. 572 (1946). The issue in New York was whether a federal tax on
the sale of mineral water from state-owned lands by the state was valid. The Court
sustained the tax.
39. The lead opinion was written by Justice Frankfurter and joined by Justice Rutledge. Justice Stone concurred in the result and was joined by Justices Reed, Murphy
and Burton. Justices Douglas and Black dissented.
40. 326 U.S. at 582. As an example, Justice Frankfurter observed that "[o] nly a
State can own a Statehouse; only a State can get income by taxing." Id. Since a state
is not uniquely capable of selling mineral water, Justice Fraikfurter concluded that
the tax should be sustained.
41. Justice Stone would have had the Court focus on whether the tax interfered
with state sovereignty, not on whether the activity was one "uniquely capable" of
being engaged in only by a state. 326 U.S. at 587-88; see note 73 infra.
42. Justice Douglas criticized the governmental/proprietary distinction which was
the starting point for Stone's and Frankfurter's opinions: "A State's project is as much
a legitimate governmental activity whether it is traditional, or akin to private enterprise, or conducted for profit .... Local government exists to provide for the welfare
of its people, not for a limited group of stockholders." 326 U.S. at 591, 593; see note
73 infra.
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"uniquely capable" test as being insufficiently protective of state
sovereignty. In any case, controversy among the Justices focused not
on whether a state sovereignty limitation follows from the structure of
the federal system, but rather on the extent to which state activities are
protected.
II.

THE COURT'S REASONING IN NATIONAL LEAGUE

The question presented in National League of Cities v. Usery, as in
Wirtz, was whether Congress' commerce power is subject to a judicially enforceable state sovereignty limitation. The Court reasoned
that a state sovereignty limitation is implied by the doctrine of intergovernmental tax immunities and by the structures and relationships
created by the Constitution in its entirety. The Court further observed
that the tenth amendment was recognized in Fry as providing an express constitutional basis for a state sovereignty limitation on congressional authority. 43 The Court's holding, however, was based principally upon inferences drawn from the nature of the federal system
rather than upon any "express limitation" on congressional power
which might be identified in the tenth amendment.
To support his argument, Justice Rehnquist cited decisions that discussed the relationship between the states and the national government as parts of the federal system. 44 The Constitution was recognized in these cases as the foundation for "an indestructible Union,
composed of indestructible States. '45 The Court cited with approval a
corollary to this proposition that "neither government may destroy the
other nor curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of its powers." 46 Because commerce clause legislation can weaken the states'
sovereignty just as effectively as a federal tax on a state's governmental
activities, 47 and because the existence of a state sovereignty restraint
43. 426 U.S. at 842-43; Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 547 n.7 (1975); see
note 29 supra.
44. Metcalf & Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514 (1926); Coyle v. Smith. 221 U.S.
559 (1911); Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 700 (1868); Lane County v. Oregon.
74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 71 (1868). All of these cases decided issues different from that
presented in National League. Thus, although they are of little precedential value.
they are useful for their discussions of the federal system.
45. Texas v. White, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) at 725, quoted at note 36 supra.
46. Metcalf& Eddy v. Mitchell, 269 U.S. 514, 523.
47. The Court observed that application of the minimum wage and maximum
hour provisions of the FLSA would have a significant impact on the states either
through substantially increased costs, forced relinquishment of important governmen-
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on the federal taxing power is settled, 48 the Court concluded that
there is no reason why the commerce power should not be similarly
49
restricted.
In his dissenting opinion, Justice Brennan took issue with the majority in three respects. First, citing Gibbons v. Ogden,50 he maintained that any state sovereignty limitation on the commerce power
has traditionally been protected only by the political process and not
by the judicial branch. 51 Second, he argued that the Court's position is
contrary to precedent, especially United States v. California52 and
Case v. Bowles.5 3 Finally, in the context of intergovernmental immunities, Justice Brennan asserted that the federal taxing power and the
commerce power are distinguishable, and that there should be no state
54
sovereignty limitation upon the latter.

Justice Stevens' separate dissenting opinion asserted that there are
several existing federal laws which directly displace state policies concerning the integral operations of the states qua states. 55 He concluded
that to subscribe to the Court's position would be to embrace a printal programs, or effective displacement of state policy choices concerning the delivery of traditional governmental services. 426 U.S. 846-52.
48. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1946); see notes 38-42 and
acompanying text supra.
49. Justice Blackmun joined the Court's opinion upon his expressed understanding that the Court was adopting a balancing test that would not preclude the enforcement of state compliance with federal guidelines where a compelling national interest was clearly involved. 426 U.S. at 856; see notes 73-79 and accompanying
text infra.
50. 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1(1824).
51. But see notes 64-72 and accompanying text infra.
52. 297 U.S. 175 (1936) (state-owned railroad held subject to Federal Safety
Appliance Act). This case is discussed in note 72 infra and referred to in notes 20
and 31 supraand note 54 infra.
53. 327 U.S. 92 (1946) (sale of timber by state, proceeds to benefit public education, held subject to Emergency Price Control Act). This case is discussed in note
74 infra.
54. Apparently, Justice Brennan supported his conclusion by the Court's earlier
rejection of state autonomy challenges to congressional exercises of the war power in
Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), and the commerce power in United States v. California, 297 U.S. 175 (1936). Justice Brennan failed to acknowledge, however, that both of
these cases involved a state acting in the capacity of a private person. See notes 72
& 74 infra.
55. Justice Stevens asserted:
The Federal Government may, I believe, require the State to act impartially when
it hires or fires [a] janitor, to withhold taxes from his pay check, to observe
safety regulations when he is performing his job, to forbid him from burning
too much soft coal in the capital furnace, from dumping untreated refuse in an
adjacent waterway, from overloading a state-owned garbage truck or from driving either the truck or the governor's limousine over 55 miles an hour.
426 U.S. at 880.
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ciple which could be the basis for the invalidation of many federal
laws which he saw as unquestionably enacted within Congress' authority.
III.

THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND THE FEDERAL
SYSTEM IN CONFLICT: A BALANCED RESOLUTION

I cannot conceive that a nation can live and prosper without a powerful centralization of government. But I am of the opinion that a centralized administration is fit only to enervate the nations in which it
exists, by incessantly diminishing their local spirit. Although such an
administration can bring together at a given moment, on a given point,
all the disposable resources of a people, it injures the renewal of those
resources. It may insure a victory in the hour of strife, but it gradually
relaxes the sinews of strength. It may help admirably the transient
greatness of a man, but not the durable prosperity of a nation.
Alexis de Tocqueville56
A.

The FederalSystem and the Commerce Power

The Constitution contemplates a federal system of government that
will prevent an enervating centralization of all governmental power,
yet will also concentrate enough authority in the national government
to resolve issues of general concern. 57 To accomplish these two goals,
the states delegated certain of their sovereign powers to the central
government in order to secure the benefit of a single and supreme authority over specified matters of national interest. 58 All other powers
56. A. DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY
quoted in Salmon. supra note 31. at 365-66.
57.

See G.

IN AMERICA

64 (Heffner ed.

GUNTHER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

1956).

81 (9th ed.

1975). One commentator has defined federalism as a compromise adjustment of
power:
(There are] twin poles of federalism: sufficient national supremacy to preserve
unity, and adequate autonomy to prevent centralization. From these standards.
other constitutional guideposts follow: an inviolable sovereignty of the states
serving to check national aggrandizement; supreme plenary enumerated powers
dominating local concerns to serve the general interest; the insulation of "indispensable" state functions from "drastic invasions" by federal power; a national
supremacy overcoming state activities burdening by their effect national areas of
power.
Salmon. supra note 31, at 359-60.
58. In this connection, note James Madison's position:
[T] he operation of the Government on the people in their individual capacities.
in its ordinary and most essential proceedings, may on the whole designate it in
this relation a nationalGovernment.
But if the Government be national with regard to the operation of its powers.
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not explicitly delegated 59 were reserved, thus preserving the states'
sovereign power over essentially local affairs. The fundamental constitutional question in National League is the extent to which the states
relinquished control over their essential governmental operations
60
when they entrusted Congress with the commerce power.
There are three possible ways the Court could have answered this
question: (1) state sovereignty can never be a limitation upon the
commerce power because the states surrendered all sovereignty over
any activities which are in or substantially affect interstate commerce
(including essential state governmental activities); 61 (2) state sovereignty is always a limitation upon the commerce power because a
state's essential governmental operations are among the "completely

it changes its aspect again when we contemplate it in relation to the extent of
its powers. . . . In this relation then the proposed Government cannot be
deemed a national one; since its jurisdiction extends to certain enumerated
objects only, and leaves to the several States a residuary and inviolable sovereignty over all other objects.
THE FEDERALIST No. 39, at 255-56 (Cooke ed. 1961) (emphasis in original).
59. In McCulloch v. Maryland, Chief Justice Marshall declared: "This government is acknowledged by all to be one of enumerated powers. . . . [I] t can exercise
only the powers granted to it ......
17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819).
The Articles of Confederation provided that the states were to retain all powers
not expressly delegated to Congress. ARTS. OF CONFED. art. II. The 10th amendment,
however, does not use the word "expressly" and speaks only in terms of "powers
not delegated," presumably to protect the exercise of Congress' implied powers from
state interference. But Chief Justice Marshall warned that the extent of Congress'
implied powers must be determined only by reference to the entire Constitution:
Even the 10th amendment, which was framed for the purpose of quieting the
excessive jealousies which had been excited, omits the word "expressly," and
declares only, that the powers "not delegated [ . .] are reserved to the states
or to the people;" thus leaving the question, whether the particular power which
may become the subject of contest, has been delegated to the one government,
or prohibited to the other, to depend on a fair construction of the whole instruinent.

McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 406 (1819) (emphasis added).
Because the truistic language of the 10th amendment does not really call for a state
sovereignty limitation upon congressional authority, the better view is that the constitutional basis for any such limitation must be rooted, if at all, in the structures
and relationships created by the entire Constitution.
60. In his dissenting opinion in Fry, Justice Rehnquist observed: "Surely there
can be no more fundamental constitutional question than that of the intention of the
Framers of the Constitution as to how authority should be allocated between the
National and State Governments." Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542, 559 (1975).
61. Essentially, this is Justice Brennan's dissenting argument. This interpretation
of the Constitution supports the conclusion that state autonomy vis-5.-vis the commerce power is a political value to be protected by the political process rather than
a constitutional value to be protected by the judiciary. For critical analysis of these
ideas, see notes 64-72 and accompanying text infra. For background on how political
safeguards operate to protect the federal system at the congressional level, see Wechsler, supra note 17.
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internal commerce of a state" 62 and are therefore never a proper subject for commerce clause legislation; 63 or (3) state sovereignty is sometimes an appropriate limitation upon the commerce power. That is, a
state's activities which are critical to its separate existence in the federal system are immune from federal regulation except when a compelling national interest bids state compliance with congressional
guidelines. This compromise approach is preferable. Its flexibility,
which serves both national and state interests, is more in harmony
with the dynamic tension between the states and the national government inherent in a federal system.
The Court cannot impose a flexible state sovereignty limitation
upon the commerce power, however, unless it is warranted by the
Constitution. In determining whether such constitutional authority
exists, the Court should consider not only the text and history of the
relevant constitutional provisions, but also those inferences which
must be drawn from the Constitution in its entirety.
B.

The State Sovereignty Limitation: A StructuralImplication

It has been proposed that the dominant method of constitutional
interpretation, which relies upon "exegesis of the particular textual
passage as a directive of [official] action," 64 be supplemented when
appropriate by inferences drawn from the structures and relationships
created by the Constitution. 65 This approach suggests that judicial
imposition of a state sovereignty limitation, which has no express con62. In Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1. 195 (1824), Chief Justice
Marshall observed that the commerce power is limited to certain subjects:
The genius and character of the whole government seems to be, that its action
is to be applied to all the external concerns of the nation, and to those internal
concerns which affect the states generally; but not to those which are completely
within a particular state, which do not affect other states, and with which it is
not necessary to interfere, for the purpose of executing some of the general
powers of the government. The completely internal commerce of a state, then,
may be considered as reserved for the state itself.
63. This approach was considered by the ninth circuit while resolving the
question of whether the Clean Air Act authorizes a federal administrator to require
the states to enact congressionally specified legislation. The court of appeals observed
in dictum that a state's governing powers are not subject to commerce clause regulation because they are not "commerce." To hold otherwise, the court concluded.
"would reduce the states to puppets of a ventriloquist Congress." Brown v. EPA,
521 F.2d 827, 839 (9th Cir. 1975).
64. C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 7 (1969).
65. See C. BLACK, STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969);
G. GUNTHER, supra note 57, at 24, 114, 256, 386-87. Charles L. Black, Jr.. the leading proponent of the structural approach, has observed that the source of the struc-
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stitutional source, may nevertheless be justified if it is necessary to the
preservation of the general values underlying the Constitution's struc66
tures and relationships.
In order to effect and sustain the values of federalism, the Constitution established a balance of power between the states and the central
government. 67 Clearly, some measure of judicially enforceable state
autonomy is essential to the continued and undisturbed existence of
this constitutionally created dynamic tension. 68 Without a judicially

enforceable restraint upon congressional power, this measure of state
autonomy would be subject to diminution by a legislative majority;
there would be nothing to protect the Constitution's balance of power
69
except the will of Congress.
The Court has approved this line of reasoning and has recognized a

judicially enforceable state sovereignty restraint in the intergoverntures is still the text of the Constitution: "[M] any existing and possible rules of
constitutional law might best be deduced from the whole structure of the Constitution, from what the text creates rather than from what the text literally commands."
Black, The Unfinished Business of the Warren Court, 46 WASH. L. REV. 3, 41 (1970).
Because the struatural approach is appropriate only when the text is ambiguous or
silent, structural implications are always subordinate to the plain meaning of the text.
See C. BLACK, supra at 3 1.
66. One commentator has observed that this school of thought rests upon the
proposition that:
[T] here was a meaningful original intent-a "sovereign act of will"-that went
into the creation of the Constitution's structures and relationships as well as into
the creation of its grants and prohibitions. If the structures and relationships
embody general values whose meaning and context evolve over time, then
dramatic judicial intervention is appropriate in order to harmonize modern developments with the general values rooted in the original structure. . . . [This
judicial intervention] can be justified as an attempt to restore (more accurately,
to approximate in the modern setting) the political power equilibrium envisioned
by the framers.
Blasi, Creativity and Legitimacy in Constitutional Law, 80 YALE L.J. 176, 192-93
(1970).
67. See Salmon, supra note 3 1, at 296, 359-60, 366 (1976).
68. Id. See C. BLACK, supra note 13, at 28-29, 40. Several commentators have
considered the potential effects of the tremendous expansion of the commerce power
on the federal system. See generally Cowen, What is Left of the Tenth Amendment?
39 N.C.L. REV. 154 (1961); Dorsen, The National No-Fault Motor Vehicle Insurance Act: A Problem in Federalism, 49 N.Y.U.L. REV. 45 (1974): Fordham, The
States in the Federal System-Vital Role or Limbo?, 49 VA. L. REV. 666 (1963);
Light, The Federal Commerce Power, 49 VA. L. REV. 717 (1963); Smith, What Has
Happened to the Tenth Amendment?, 10 LA. BAR J. 21 (1962). See also Casto, The
Doctrinal Development of the Tenth Amendment, 51 W. VA. L. REV. 227 (1949);
Crampton, The Supreme Court and the Decline of State Power, 2 J. LAW & EcON.
175 (1959); Merrill, The Function of the States Today-A Tentative Blueprint for
Federalism in Twentieth Century America, 30 IOWA L. REV. 169 (1945); Cudlip,
The Function of the States, 43 MICH. L. REV. 95 (1944).
69. Reliance upon the political process alone to enforce 'the Constitution directly
conflicts with the doctrine of judicial review. The principle that the Constitution is
supreme law and controls all other law implies that the Supreme Court has the power
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mental tax immunities cases. 70 The state sovereignty limitation upon
the federal taxing power has no express constitutional source; rather it
is implied by the structures and relationships created by the Constitution. Because the federal system's balance of power can be as effectively disrupted by commerce clause regulation as by federal taxes, 71 a
judicially enforceable state sovereignty limitation should be imposed
upon the commerce power in all but exceptional situations of national
72
interest.
to construe and apply the Constitution against the will of a legislative majority. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). Thus, Justice Douglas was surely
correct when he asserted:
The notion that the sovereign position of the States must find its protection in
the will of a transient majority of Congress is foreign to and a negation of our
constitutional system. . . . The Constitution was designed to keep the balance
[of power] between the States and the Nation outside the field of legislative controversy.
New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572, 594 (1946) (dissenting opinion). For discussion of the countermajoritarian aspects of judicial review, see A. BICKEL, THE
LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH 16-23 (1962); P. BREST, PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL
DECISIONMAKING 956-66 (1975); Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial
Review, 66 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1952).
In his dissenting opinion in National League Justice Brennan asserted that the
Court's position is contrary to "Chief Justice Marshall's postulate that the Constitution contemplates that restraint upon exercise by Congress of its plenary power lie
in the political process and not in the judicial process." 426 U.S. 833, 857 (1976).
A close reading, however, of Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1 (1824), from
which Justice Brennan quotes to support his argument, compels the conclusion that
Chief Justice Marshall viewed the role of political safeguards as a restraint on Congress' abuse of its constitutionally defined powers. See note 17 supra. It remains for
the judiciary, in an appropriate case, to prevent Congress from exceeding its constitutional authority by enforcing the limitations prescribed in the Constitution through
judicial review.
The heart of Justice Brennan's argument is that there is no express state sovereignty limitation anywhere in the Constitution including the 10th amendment. State
autonomy is. therefore, a political value to be protected by the political process.
rather than a constitutional value to be protected by the judiciary. Thus, it appears
Justice Brennan and Justice Rehnquist disagree not so much as to the proper role of
political safeguards, but as to whether a constitutional value is really involved in
National League.
70. See notes 34-42 and accompanying text supra.
7 1. In his dissenting opinion in Fry, Justice Rehnquist argued that federal regulation of state governmental operations imposes a greater burden upon the states
than federal taxation because regulation adversely affects not only state revenues but
also state policy choices. 421 U.S. 542, 554 (1975). See note 31 supra.
72. Justice Stone reached the opposite conclusion in dictum in United States v.
California, 297 U.S. 175, 184 (1936). That case involved the question of whether a
small state-owned belt line railroad used to facilitate unloading and loading of ships
at San Francisco could escape application of the Federal Safety Appliance Act
(FSAA). Writing for a unanimous Court. Justice Stone reasoned that because the
states surrendered all sovereignty over interstate commercial matters, state sovereignty
could not be a limitation upon the commerce power. Therefore. California's railroad
was required to comply with the FSAA. The Court sustained the application of the
FSAA to this railroad because it found that California had engaged in interstate
commerce by rail. This holding is consistent with the doctrine that when a state
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C.

The Flexible Limitation

Unlike the state autonomy restriction upon the federal taxing power,73 the immunity of essential state governmental operations from
commerce clause regulation can and should be flexible in order to
accomplish the goals of federalism. Although there must be sufficient
state autonomy to prevent centralization of all governmental power,
there must be enough power concentrated in the national government
to deal effectively with issues of general concern. Thus, the Court's
decision to distinguish rather than overrule Fry7 4 comports with the
voluntarily undertakes activities in the nature of a private business, it divests itself
of any attributes of sovereignty as to those transactions and becomes like a private
person. See Bank of the United States v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 22 U.S. (9
Wheat.) 904, 907 (1824); cf. Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964). It does
not follow from United States v. California, however, that a state's sovereign functions are also subject to congressional control, as Justice Stone suggested in dictum.
Because California did not hold that there is no state sovereignty limitation upon
the commerce power, Justice Brennan's reliance upon the case in his National
League dissent is misplaced.
73. The ultimate justification for the absolute immunity of state governmental
activities from federal taxes is probably that alternative sources of tax revenue are
always available to Congress to satisfy national needs. Thus, any uncertainty concerning the extent of the states' tax immunity cannot be resolved by weighing the
national interest in acquiring tax revenue against the states' interest in operating
their governments free from federal interference. Instead, the Court has defined the
scope of the states' tax immunity to be correlative with those activities which are
purely governmental. New York v. United States, 326 U.S. 572 (1956). The problem
has been to articulate an acceptable definition of "purely governmental activities."
Justice Frankfurter asserted that the Constitution simply does not permit federal
taxes on revenue "uniquely capable of being earned only by a State." Id. at 582.
Justice Douglas would have held all state activities to be governmental and therefore
immune. Id. at 591. Although Justice Stone essentially agreed with Justice Frankfurter, he would have further protected the states from all other taxes which so
affect state governmental costs as to "unduly impair" the performance of the states'
sovereign functions of government. Id. at 587-88. The words "unduly impair" suggest that Justice Stone had in mind an additional sphere of conditional immunity
based on a balancing of state and national interests which would supplement Justice
Frankfurter's core of absolute immunity. See notes 40-42 supra.
74. The Court's decision to distinguish Fry makes National League consistent
with Case v. Bowles, 327 U.S. 92 (1946), despite Justice Brennan's argument to
the contrary. That case presented the issue of whether the Emergency Price Control
Act (EPCA), an exercise of Congress' war power, was applicable to a sale of timber
by a state from lands granted to the state by Congress specifically for the benefit of
the state's public school system. The proceeds of the sale were to be used only for
school purposes. Despite the state's arguments for a state sovereignty limitation on
Congress' war power, the Court upheld the application of the EPCA's maximum
price provisions to the sale.
This result is consistent with National League for at least two reasons not expressly considered therein. First, Fry was distinguished in National League because
the ESA was only a temporary measure enacted to combat a national emergency.
The same is true of the Emergency Price Control Act of World War II. Second, the
intergovernmental tax immunities cases, e.g., New York v. United States, 326 U.S.
572 (1946); Allen v. Regents, 304 U.S. 439 (1938); South Carolina v. United
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structure of the federal system. The Court's decision suggests that
each state's immunity must bow to the needs of the union when national interests clearly outweigh those of the individual states,7 5 the
degree of congressional intrusion into the states' affairs is relatively
slight,7 6 and state non-compliance would drastically impair federal
action .77
It must be emphasized, however, that the judicial imposition of a
state sovereignty limitation is not appropriate when there is no conStates, 199 U.S. 437 (1905), all suggest that how the state is going to use the proceeds from its activities is not relevant to the question of whether those proceeds are
subject to federal tax. Instead, the Court has always looked to the nature of the
activity itself. At the minimum, if it is not one that only a state can perform, but
rather essentially in the nature of a private business, then the proceeds are subject
to the federal tax laws. In Bowles, although the proceeds of the timber sale were
earmarked for public school purposes, the activity of selling timber is not one unique
to states. Indeed, the selling of timber from state lands is, in principle, nearly identical
to selling mineral water from state lands.
75. In Fry, the Court sustained the Economic Stabilization Act partly because it
was "an emergency measure to counter severe inflation that threatened the national
economy." 421 U.S. 542, 548 (1975). In National League, the Court described the
ESA as having been "occasioned by an extremely serious problem which endangered
the well-being of all the component parts of our federal system and which only
collective action by the National Government might forestall." 426 U.S. 833, 853
(1976). The Court concluded that the state sovereignty limitation on the commerce
power must itself be limited, i.e., that it is "not so inflexible as to preclude temporary enactments tailored to combat a national emergency." Id. at 853. Whether
something less than a national emergency would be cause for overriding the state
autonomy limitation was not considered. Justice Blackmun joined the Court's
opinion, however, with the understanding that the holding did not preclude the exercise of federal power "in areas such as environmental protection, where the federal
interest is demonstrably greater and where state facility compliance with imposed
federal standards would be essential." Id. at 856.
One point not expressed by the Court and not recognized in Justice Stevens' dissent, see note 55 and accompanying text supra, is that while a state's interest in
structuring the disposition of its revenue is high, its interest in some matters (e.g.,
how fast the governor's limousine may be driven) is relatively low. None of the
examples of "unquestionably permissible" federal regulation of the state qua state
given in Justice Stevens' dissenting opinion interferes with a critical governmental
function as directly and seriously as would the 1974 amendments to the FLSA. When
balancing the national and state interests, the Court should consider the significance
of the state governmental function threatened as well as the magnitude of the national interest. See Comment, An Affirmative ConstitutionalRight: The Tenth Amendment and the Resolution of Federalism Conflicts, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 876. 896898 (1976).
76. In distinguishing Fry', the Court was impressed by the relatively slight intrusion upon the protected area of state sovereignty worked by the ESA as compared
with the 1974 amendments to the FLSA. The ESA was a temporary measure: the
1974 amendments were intended to be permanent. The effect of the ESA was to
reduce the pressures upon state budgets; the 1974 amendments would have substantially increased them. 426 U.S. at 846-850.
77. Whether state noncompliance with federally imposed standards would drastically impair federal policy is a factor apparently to be considered separately from
whether the federal interest clearly outweighs the state's. See id. at 853-56; Fry v.
United States, 421 U.S. 542. 548 (1975).
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gressional interference with a state's sovereign functions. Thus, when
a state voluntarily engages in business activities of a private nature,
thereby divesting itself of its sovereignty as to those transactions,78 the
state has no basis for challenging federal regulation of those transac79
tions on state autonomy grounds.
D.

The Implicationsof National League

Whether Congress can affect the essential governmental activities
of the states through exercise of its power to enforce the fourteenth
amendment or the spending power are questions the Court left expressly unanswered. 80 Because these two powers raise different problems vis-A-vis the states, they will be treated separately.
1.

Section 5 of the FourteenthAmendment

Shortly after National League was decided, the Court confronted
the question of whether, under section 5 of the fourteenth amendment, 81 Congress has the power to authorize suit in federal court by
state employees against a state for violations of the Civil Rights Act
despite the eleventh amendment's shield of sovereign immunity. 82 The
Court upheld Congress' authority upon the reasoning that there can
be no state immunity to the power of Congress under section 5 because the states surrendered all sovereignty in this area when they ratified the fourteenth amendment.8 3 This result is consistent with the
proposition that judicial imposition of a state sovereignty limitation is
78.
79.

See note 72 supra.
For example, the states that have entered the liquor store business have no

immunity to general federal regulation of that business. Cf. South Carolina v. United
States, 199 U.S. 437 (1905) (revenue from state-operated liquor business held subject to federal income taxation despite state autonomy challenge). See note 37 supra.

80. The Court declared:
We express no view as to whether different results might obtain if Congress
seeks to affect integral operations of state governments by exercising authority
granted it under other sections of the Constitution such as the Spending Power,
Art. I, § 8, cl.1, or § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
426 U.S. at 852 n.17.
81. Section 5 contains the following language which allows Congress to implement the 14th amendment: "The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate

legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CONST.amend. XIV, § 5.
82. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). U.S. CONST. amend. XI provides:
"The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit

in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State."
83. 427 U.S. at 456. See also Ex Parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 345 (1880).
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not appropriate where there is no state sovereignty involved. Several
district courts have adopted this rationale in sustaining the application
of the Equal Pay Act 84 and the Age Discrimination in Employment
86
Act 8 5 to state employees.
2.

The Spending Power

Unless the state sovereignty limitation announced in National
League applies to Congress' spending power, Congress could effectively control the minimum wages and maximum hours of most state
employees simply by conditioning grants of federal funds to the states
upon compliance with these FLSA provisions. The Court's express
reservation of judgment on this issue87 suggests that it might be willing
to reconsider the doctrine, firmly established in Oklahoma v. United
States Civil Service Commission,a8 that there is no state autonomy restraint upon the kinds of conditions Congress may attach to categor89
ical grants to the states.
84. E.g., Usery v. Dallas Independent School Dist.. 421 F. Supp. Ill (N.D. Tex.
1976). The court concluded that the Equal Pay Act as applied to state employees
could be sustained on the basis of the commerce clause or § 5 of the 14th amendment.
The court observed: "Whatever powers are reserved to the States, the power to discriminately oppress its own citizens on the basis of social criteria is not among them."
Id. at 115. The court further noted that the Equal Pay Act does not substantially disrupt state operations and that the national interest in preventing wage discrimination
clearly outweighs the state's interest in penalizing its employees for their sex.
85. Usery v. Board of Educ.. 421 F. Supp. 718 (1976). The court upheld the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) because (I) the national interest in preventing arbitrary discrimination outweighs the state's interest in continuing such discrimination; (2) the degree of federal intrusion into state affairs is minimal: (3) the
ADEA does not "directly" displace state employment policies as it leaves the employment structure essentially intact; and (4) § 5 of the 14th amendment provides a constitutional basis in addition to the commerce clause for the ADEA because arbitrary
discrimination practices by state employers deny equal protection of the law.
86. For the time being, National League has seriously frustrated attempts to extend federal collective bargaining rights to state employees. Aaron. Labor Law Decisions of the Supreme Court, 1975-76 Term, 92 LAB.

REL. REP. (BNA) 311. 314.

345 n.30 (Aug. 16. 1976).
87. 426 U.S. at 852 n.17; see note 80 supra.
88. 330 U.S. 127, 142-44 (1947). In that case, the Court rejected a state sovereignty challenge to the attachment of a condition to federal highway grants. The
condition was that no state official primarily employed in activities financed in whole
or in part by federal funds could actively engage in political activities.
89. The Court has already recognized a limited state sovereignty restraint upon
conditional federal spending programs. In Edelman v. Jordan. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
the Court held that the 11th amendment barred federal courts from compelling the
retroactive payment of funds from the state treasury which were wrongfully withheld
from the plaintiff-beneficiaries of a federal-state welfare program. Prospective injunctive relief against state officials who act unlawfully, however, is available in federal
courts. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
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The Oklahoma v. Civil Service doctrine derives from the premise
that Congress has exclusive authority over the expenditures of federal
revenue-it may choose who will directly benefit from federal monies
and whether the recipient must comply with any conditions. 9 0 In
theory, conditional federal aid can be refused whenever the intended
recipient declines to comply with the conditions. Thus, federal grantsin-aid to the states, which are conditioned upon the conformance of
state governmental activities to federal standards, have been held not

coercive and therefore not in conflict with the restrictions implicit in
the federal system.9 1
The Court should reject this line of reasoning because it fails to
recognize that the states simply are not at liberty to refuse conditions
which unnecessarily interfere with essential sovereign functions, when
those conditions are attached to money they need to support essential
social welfare programs, highway projects and other important federally funded activities. Instead, the Court should impose a flexible state
sovereignty limitation upon conditions to federal grants-in-aid similar
92
to that imposed in NationalLeague upon commerce clause legislation.
Because of increasing fiscal centralization, judicial intervention is
essential to the preservation of the constitutional values rooted in the
93
federal form of government.

90. See note 88 and accompanying text supra; Engdahl, State Power Over Plowshare: The ConstitutionalFramework, 14 ATOMIc ENERGY L.J. 243 (1972).
91. Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S. 127 (1947); cf.
Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 585 (1937) (unemployment compensation
provisions of Social Security Act designed to induce enactment of state unemployment
laws through a tax and credit scheme held not coercive "in contravention of the Tenth
Amendment or of restrictions implicit in our federal form of government").
92. The Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) has concluded that the fiscal independence of the states is necessary to any substantial improvement in the balance of power in the federal system. ACIR recommends that the
use of categorical grants to state and local governments be restricted to situations involving very specific national objectives. Otherwise, block grants and "no-strings" grants
should be used in order to secure the advantages inherent in decentralized authority.
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, IMPROVING URBAN AMER-

ICA: A CHALLENGE TO FEDERALISM 16 (1976). ACIR's approach to spending programs
is similar to the Court's approach to the commerce power in National League.
93. In his dissenting opinion in United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 87 (1936),
where the Agricultural Adjustment Act of 1933 (authorizing payments to farmers for
a reduction of their productive acreage) was held unconstitutional, Justice Stone observed: "The power to tax and spend is not without constitutional restraints. One restriction is that the purpose must be truly national. Another is that it may not be used
to coerce action left to state control." See also note 57 supra.
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CONCLUSION

The Constitution contemplates a federal distribution of power to
secure the effective governance of national affairs and to preserve the
liberty, diversity, creativity and vitality of the states and the people.
The national government must have authority to control local activities when required by the general interest, but the states must enjoy
sufficient autonomy to prevent centralization of all governmental
power.
To ensure the continued existence of the federal system as established by the Constitution, there must be a judicially enforceable state
sovereignty restriction upon Congress' taxing, commerce, and
spending powers to protect the states' sovereign functions from unnecessary interference. When the national interest clearly compels state
compliance with federal standards, it is consistent with the structure of
the federal system that the states' immunity defer to the exigencies of
the Union. There is no state sovereignty limitation, however, upon
Congress' control over transactions where no sovereignty exists. Thus,
there is no state sovereignty restraint upon Congress' power to enforce
the fourteenth amendment. Similarly, a state cannot assert a state autonomy challenge to federal regulation when it sheds its sovereignty
by voluntarily engaging in economic activities of a private nature.
The state sovereignty limitation on the taxing and commerce
powers should be extended to the spending power in order to protect
the federal system's balance of power from disruption by an increasing fiscal centralization. The concentration of authority where it
is most effective, responsive, and creative can be accomplished only
by securing fiscal as well as political autonomy to the states.
Kim Buckley
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